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JURISDICTION
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(a) this Court has appellate
jurisdiction over a judgment of the Utah Court of Appeals. Further, pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(5), the Utah Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear this appeal
in an order dated July 6, 2016.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue 1: Whether the court of appeals erred in holding Petitioner’s suit must be
dismissed for failure to bring its subrogation action in the name of its insured.
Standard of Review: “On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of
appeals, not the decision of the trial court. In doing so, this court adopts the same
standard of review used by the court of appeals: questions of law are reviewed for
correctness, and the trial court's factual findings are reversed only if clearly erroneous.”
State v. Harmon, 910 P. 2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995) (citing Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d
97, 101 n.2 (Utah 1992).
Interpretation of statutes and decisional precedents are reviewed for correctness.
See MacFarlane v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 2006 UT 25, ¶ 9, 134 P.3d 1116 (“A matter
of statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review on appeal for correctness.”
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted)); see also In re Adoption of A.F.K., 2009
UT App 198, ¶ 16, 216 P.3d 980 (explaining that “issues that require interpretation of
prior decisional precedents” are “questions of law that are reviewed for correctness”
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted)).
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Preservation in Record: This issue was preserved at numerous points before the
trial court, including R. at 457–75; R. at 821.1 This issue also arose when the Utah Court
of Appeals rendered its decision on February 25, 2015. Petitioner requested certiorari to
hear this issue on March 24, 2016. Pet. for Writ of Cert. at 18–19. The statement of this
issue is taken verbatim from this Courts’ order granting certiorari on July 6, 2016.
Issue 2: Whether Rule 17 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provided an alternative
to dismissal of Petitioner’s complaint.
Standard of Review: “On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of
appeals, not the decision of the trial court. In doing so, this court adopts the same
standard of review used by the court of appeals: questions of law are reviewed for
correctness, and the trial court's factual findings are reversed only if clearly erroneous.”
Harmon, 910 P. 2d at 1199.
“[T]he interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of law that we review for
correctness.” Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, ¶ 15, 16 P.3d 540.
Preservation in Record: This issue arose when the Utah Court of Appeals
rendered its decision on February 25, 2015. Petitioner requested certiorari to hear this
issue on March 24, 2016. Pet. for Writ of Cert. at 18–19. The statement of this issue is
taken verbatim from this Courts’ order granting certiorari on July 6, 2016.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
1

In this brief, the court record of pleadings and papers shall be referred to as “R. page
number.”
2

STATUTES:
Utah Code Annotated Section § 31A-21-108: Subrogation actions
Subrogation actions may be brought by the insurer in the name of its
insured.
RULES:
Rule 17 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (in relevant part):
(a) Real party in interest. Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of
the real party in interest. An executor, administrator, guardian, bailee,
trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract
has been made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute
may sue in that person's name without joining the party for whose benefit
the action is brought; and when a statute so provides, an action for the use
or benefit of another shall be brought in the name of the state of Utah. No
action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name
of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after
objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or
substitution of, the real party in interest; and such ratification, joinder, or
substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had been commenced
in the name of the real party in interest.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Appellant/Petitioner, Educators Mutual Insurance Association (“EMIA”), appeals
the Utah Court of Appeals’ opinion Wilson v. Educators Mutual Insurance Association,
2016 UT App 38, 368 P.3d 471. A true and correct copy of said opinion is attached
hereto and hereby incorporated as Addend. A. Appellees/Respondents in this matter are
Everett P. Wilson Jr. and Darla Wilson (“Wilsons”). The nature of this appeal focuses on
whether an insurer has the right to bring a subrogation action in its own name or if the
insurer must bring the action in the name of the insured. This appeal focuses secondarily
3

on the question of if an insurer must bring a subrogation action in the name of the
insured, but the insurer instead brings the action in its own name, is dismissal of the
subrogation claim required, or does Rule 17 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provide an
alternative to dismissal.
Jessica Wilson, an insured of EMIA, was struck by a car while crossing the road
and passed away shortly thereafter from her injuries. R. at 571. EMIA paid for Jessica
Wilson’s medical treatment. R. at 561. Jessica Wilson’s parents filed a wrongful death
claim against the driver for burial expenses and compensation for loss of their daughter’s
society, love, companionship, protection, and affection. R. at 570. EMIA filed a
subrogation claim in its own name against the driver to recoup the expenses EMIA had
paid for Jessica Wilson’s medical treatment following the accident. R. at 771–75. EMIA
and Wilsons’ cases were consolidated. R. at 541. The liability insurance carrier for the
tortfeasor interplead the driver’s policy limit—$100,000—to be allocated by the district
court, and EMIA and the Wilsons released their claims against the driver. R. at 543. The
district court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Regarding
Allocation of Interpleader Amount Deposited with the Court (attached as Addend. B),
allocating $24,182.31 to EMIA, and $75,817.69 to the Wilsons. R. at 844.
Course of Proceedings/Disposition in the Lower Courts
EMIA filed a subrogation claim against the tortfeasor to recoup the expenses
EMIA had paid for Jessica Wilson’s medical treatment following the accident. R. at 771–
75. The tortfeasor moved to dismiss EMIA’s claim, challenging EMIA’s standing to
bring its suit. R. at 560–61. The district court entered an order (attached as Addend. C)
4

denying the motion to dismiss, adjudging that EMIA had standing to bring an action for
subrogation under Utah’s Subrogation Statute, and to do so in its own name. R. at 821.
EMIA and Wilsons’ cases were consolidated. R. at 541. The liability insurance carrier
interplead the driver’s policy limit—$100,000—to be allocated by the court, and EMIA
and the Wilsons released their claims against the driver. R. at 543.
The district court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
Regarding Allocation of Interpleader Amount Deposited with the Court, allocating
$24,182.31 to EMIA, and $75,817.69 to the Wilsons. R. at 844. The Wilsons filed a
Notice of Appeal on February 27, 2015. R. at 759. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3102(4) the Utah Supreme Court transferred the matter to the Utah Court of Appeals on or
about March 19, 2015. R. at 763.
After briefing and oral argument, the Utah Court of Appeals rendered its opinion
on February 25, 2016. That opinion reversed the decision of the Fourth Judicial District
Court on the basis that EMIA lacked standing to bring its subrogation claim against the
tortfeasor in its own name, and remanded the matter with instructions that EMIA’s claims
be dismissed. Wilson, 2016 UT App 38, ¶ 13, 368 P.3d 471. Because the Utah Court of
Appeals determined that EMIA lacked standing, the other issues presented by the
Wilsons on appeal were not addressed directly in its opinion. Id. at ¶ 7. EMIA sought
review of the Utah Court of Appeals’ decision, filing its Petition for Writ of Certiorari on
March 24, 2016. Certiorari was granted by the Utah Supreme Court in an order dated July
6, 2016.
Statement of Facts
5

On or about September 19, 2010, Jessica Wilson was walking in a crosswalk on
the campus of Brigham Young University when she was struck by a car driven by Cade
Krueger (the “tortfeasor”). R. at 571. Jessica Wilson was severely injured as a result and
later passed away. Id.
At all times relevant to this matter, Jessica Wilson was insured through EMIA for
medical expenses. R. at 843. The medical policy contains provisions and terms governing
EMIA’s right to reimbursement and subrogation. R. at 624–25. See generally R. at 605–
85 (setting forth full medical policy). As a result of the automobile accident caused by the
tortfeasor, EMIA paid medical expenses on behalf of Jessica Wilson in the amount of
$78,692.34. R. at 772.
EMIA and the Wilsons filed separate claims against the tortfeasor; EMIA sued for
reimbursement, including interest, of the medical expenses it paid in behalf of Jessica
Wilson that were incurred when the tortfeasor’s vehicle struck her, and Wilsons sued the
tortfeasor for the wrongful death of Jessica Wilson. R. at 843.
The tortfeasor filed a motion to dismiss EMIA’s suit, arguing that EMIA lacked
standing to bring its suit. R. at 560–61 The district court entered an order denying the
motion to dismiss, adjudging that EMIA had standing to bring an action for subrogation
under Utah’s Subrogation Statute, and to do so in its own name. R. at 821.
The claims filed by EMIA and the Wilsons were consolidated and the parties
stipulated to release and dismiss the tortfeasor from the lawsuit upon the tortfeasor

6

interpleading $100,000—the tortfeasor insurance liability policy limit—with the trial
court. R. at 543, 841.
Upon weighing the equities between Wilsons and EMIA, the trial court ordered
that Wilsons receive $75,817.69 of the interpleaded funds, while EMIA received
$24,182.31. R. at 840–44.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals erred in concluding that EMIA lacked standing to
pursue a subrogation action in its own name and in concluding that neither Utah’s
subrogation statute nor Utah’s case law grant in insurer the right to pursue a subrogation
action in its own name. Utah case law going back to the turn of the twentieth century
clearly holds that a subrogating insurer is a real party in interest in a subrogation
proceeding and may maintain its subrogation action in its own name. No case or statute
has altered this real party in interest rule, and insurers continue to bring subrogation
actions in either their own name or the name of their insured. Until the court of appeals
decision in this matter, no Utah appellate court has questioned the insurer’s right to
maintain a subrogation action in its own name in the last seventy years.
In reaching its conclusion, the court of appeals relied heavily on the 1944 case,
Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co., 152 P.2d 98 (Utah 1944). This reliance on Johanson is
misplaced primarily because the portions of Johanson quoted by the court of appeals
were not the law the Johanson Court adopted; the Johanson Court first analyzed the
different positions taken by other states (including the portions quoted by the court of
appeals) before adopting a completely contrary position.
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The court of appeals ignores several policy implications including how its decision
would alter what losses an insurer is willing to cover, how insurers will likely be required
to raise insurance premiums, and how the court of appeals’ decision would make it
impossible for an insurer to recover in instances where an insured passes away from the
actions or inactions of a tortfeasor. Also, while not central to the issues here on appeal,
the court of appeals’ opinion includes problematic dicta concerning an heirs’ supposed
superior right to reimbursement over an insurer when an insured passes away. This
language, unless addressed, will likely cause confusion in future cases where insureds
pass away from the actions or inactions of a tortfeasor.
Finally, even if the court of appeals was correct that an insurer cannot bring a
subrogation action in its own name, the court of appeals was incorrect to dismiss EMIA’s
action. Rather, Rule 17 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides an alternative to
dismissal.
ARGUMENT
THE DECISION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD BE
REVERSED BECAUSE ITS INTERPRETATION OF UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED § 31A-21-108 WAS INCORRECT, AND THE DECISION WAS
CONTRARY TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 17 OF THE UTAH RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
As this Court has instructed, “On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of
appeals, not the decision of the trial court. In doing so, this court adopts the same
standard of review used by the court of appeals: questions of law are reviewed for
correctness, and the trial court's factual findings are reversed only if clearly erroneous.”
State v. Harmon, 910 P. 2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995).
8

In this matter the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals should be reversed
primarily for two reasons: (1) the Utah Court of Appeals’ interpretation of Utah Code
Ann. § 31A-21-108 was incorrect; and (2) even assuming that the Utah Court of Appeals’
interpretation was correct, remanding the matter to the trial court with instructions to
dismiss EMIA’s claims was a violation of Rule 17 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
I.

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS’ INTERPRETATION OF § 31A-21-108
WAS INCORRECT.
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-108 provides “[s]ubrogation actions may be brought by

the insurer in the name of its insured.” The court of appeals held § 31A-21-108 does not
give EMIA standing to bring a subrogation action in its own name. See Wilson, 2016 UT
App 38, ¶ 8, 12, 368 P.3d 471. Interpretation of statutes and decisional precedents are
reviewed for correctness. MacFarlane, 2006 UT 25, ¶ 9, 134 P.3d 1116; In re Adoption
of A.F.K., 2009 UT App 198, ¶ 16, 216 P.3d 980.
In this matter, the court of appeals’ construction of § 31A-21-108 is untenable for
several reasons and its decision should be reversed. First, the manner in which the court
of appeals interpreted the permissive “may” in § 31A-21-108 nullifies the effect of the
statute because the right for an insurer to subrogate already exists at common law.
Second, Utah case law illustrates that insurers regularly bring subrogation actions in their
own names, and have before the enactment of § 31A-21-108. Third, the court of appeals
misapplied Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co., 152 P.2d 98 (Utah 1944). Fourth, the
manner in which the court of appeals interpreted § 31A-21-108 would make it impossible
for an insurer to subrogate against a tortfeasor if the insured dies as a result of a
9

tortfeasor’s negligence. Fifth, the court of appeals’ interpretation of § 31A-21-108 creates
serious policy issues. Finally, the court of appeals cited incorrectly to case law to support
its proposition that heirs have a superior right of recovery.
A.

UNDER THE COURT OF APPEALS’ REASONING, THERE WOULD
HAVE BEEN NO NEED TO ENACT § 31A-21-108.
The manner in which the court of appeals construed §31A-21-108 nullifies the

effect of the statute and makes it meaningless. The court of appeals examined the
common law to determine whether an insurer may bring a subrogation action in its own
name, stating, “a suit at law to enforce such right of subrogation must, at common law, be
brought in the name of the insured, rather than by the insurance company in its own name
and right.” Wilson, 2016 UT App 38, ¶ 10, 368 P.3d 471 (quoting Johanson, 152 P.2d at
104). The court of appeals’ reliance on Johansen is misplaced for reasons that will be
discussed in Section I(C) of this Brief. However, if the common law already allowed an
insurer to bring a subrogation action in the name of the insured, as the court of appeals
asserts, then there would have been no reason for the legislature to enact §31A-21-108, as
under the court of appeals’ interpretation of the statue, its only effect is to allow insurers
to bring a subrogation action in the name of an insured.
B.

A REVIEW OF UTAH’S SUBROGATION CASE LAW SHOWS THAT
UNDER UTAH LAW THE SUBROGATING INSURER HAS LONG BEEN
REGARDED AS A REAL PARTY IN INTEREST WITH A RIGHT TO
BRING A SUBROGATION ACTION IN ITS OWN NAME.
The Utah Court of Appeals stated, “Our review of Utah case law convinces us that

. . . no independent right exists for an insurer to seek subrogated damages in its own
name.” Wilson, 2016 UT App 38, ¶ 8, 368 P.3d 471. On the contrary, a review of Utah
10

case law shows that Utah has long recognized that the subrogating insurer is a real party
in interest in a subrogation action and has the right to seek subrogated damages in its own
name.
In 1913, National Union Fire Insurance Co. brought an action against a defendant
railroad company on behalf of its insured. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Denver & R.G.R.
Co., 44 Utah 26, 137 P. 653, 653 (1913). The defendant argued that because National
Union had not reimbursed the insured for the full amount of the damages suffered (the
insured had not been made whole), the insured maintained an interest in the claim and the
claim should have been brought by the insured. Id. at 654. The Utah Supreme Court
rejected this argument. Id. at 654–57. The supreme court noted that a subrogating insurer
acts as an assignee and thus is a real party in interest with a right to bring an action in its
own name, whether or not there is a formal assignment issued. See id. at 655–56. The
Utah Supreme Court established this insurer as real party in interest rule reasoning that
even if no formal assignment had been issued, an equitable assignment had still arisen.
Id. The Utah Supreme Court explained:
Not only does the [insurer as real party in interest] rule prevail when the
assignment is absolute and complete and the assignee is the legal owner of
the demand; it prevails with equal force in cases where the assignment is
simply equitable in its character; and the assignee's title would not have
been recognized in any form by a court of law under the old system but
would have been purely equitable. Such assignee, being the real party in
interest, must bring the action in his own name.
Id. Thus, even if the insurer “only obtained an equitable or a qualified interest as
contradistinguished from an absolute and unqualified interest, still . . . it was the real
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party in interest, so far its interest extended, and the action could be commenced and
maintained in its name.” Id. at 655.
In the 1938 case Baker v. Wycoff, the Utah Supreme Court interpreted then recent
changes in Utah’s worker’s compensation statute to determine if a subrogating insurer
has a legal right to maintain a subrogation action. 79 P.2d 77, 80 (1938). The legislation
interpreted in Baker stated that an “insurance carrier having paid the compensation shall
be subrogated to the rights of such employee or his dependents to recover against such
third person.” Id. 80–81 (emphasis added). However, the statute did not explain how a
subrogation action should be commenced, nor in whose name the action should be
pursued. See id. The supreme court concluded that, while the injured employee originally
had a valid cause of action, “[a]ny right of action he had [was then] passed, under the
statute, to the insurance carrier, who was by law subrogated to the rights of the
workman.” Id. at 81. Thus, the Utah Supreme Court held that a subrogating insurer is the
real party in interest in a subrogation claim with ownership of the claim and a right to
bring the claim in its own name. See id.
The supreme court later revisited this same subrogation statute in Johanson v.
Cudahy Packing Co. to determine whether the insured, along with the subrogating
insurer, is also a real party in interest. 152 P.2d 98 (1944).2 The supreme court seemed to
agree with the proposition that if the insured has been made whole, the insured “would no
longer have any interest in the cause of action,” and the insurer would remain the sole

2

Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co. will be analyzed in much greater detail below in
Section I(C) of this Brief.
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party in interest. Id. at 103. However, if the insurer has not paid the full amount of the
loss suffered, the injured insured retains an interest in the action. Id. at 104. Under such
circumstances, both the insurer (“as equitable assignees of the insured,” id. at 104) and
the injured insured are “co–owners of the insured's right of action.” Id. at 104.
As the twentieth century progressed, the Utah Supreme Court continually
recognized a subrogating insurer’s right to bring a subrogation action in its own name. In
1969, the Supreme Court decided State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. v. Farmers
Insurance Exchange, 450 P.2d 458 (1969). In State Farm, the subrogating insurer
brought a subrogation claim, in its own name, to recover for medical expenses it had paid
on behalf of its insured. See State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 493 P.2d
1002, 1002–03 (1972) (providing factual background for the 1969 case). The tortfeasor
argued that under Utah law, insurers could not pursue personal injury subrogation claims.
Id. The supreme court dismissed this argument, allowing insurers to bring personal injury
subrogation claims in the insurer’s name. State Farm, 450 P.2d at 459.
In Transamerica Insurance Co. v. Barnes, Transamerica’s insured was involved in
a car accident where a passenger in the insured’s car was injured. 505 P.2d 783 (Utah
1972). Based on the insurance policy, Transamerica paid monies on behalf of the injured
passenger. Transamerica notified the tortfeasor of its subrogation rights, but the tortfeasor
sought to bypass the insurance company by settling with the injured party. Transamerica
brought a subrogation action in its own name to enforce its subrogation rights. While
Transamerica did not prevail, the Utah Supreme Court did not question whether or not
Transamerica had standing to bring the subrogation action in its own name.
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In Educators Mutual Insurance Association v. Allied Property & Casualty
Insurance Co., Educators Mutual improperly pursued its subrogation rights through a
fraud cause of action. 890 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1995). The Utah Supreme Court affirmed
dismissing Educators Mutual’s case based on fraud, noting that Educators Mutual should
have pursued its rights through a subrogation action, noting “It is well settled that an
insurer may bring a cause of action on behalf of its insured.” Id. at 1031. The Educators
Mutual Court then cited to both State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. v. Farmers Insurance
Exchange, 450 P.2d 458 (Utah 1969)—a case where the insurance company brought its
subrogation claim in its own name, not the name of its insured—and Utah Code Ann. §
31A-21-108 (“Subrogation actions may be brought by the insurer in the name of its
insured.”). Educators Mutual, 890 P.2d at 1031. The Utah Supreme Court did not
indicate that the insurer had run afoul of either the real party in interest rule or standing
rule by bringing the claim in its own name.
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Northwestern National
Insurance Co., State Farm brought a subrogation action in its own name to recoup monies
State Farm paid after its insured was involved in an automobile accident. 912 P.2d 983
(Utah 1996). The Utah Supreme Court explained, “Utah law clearly recognizes an
insurer's right to bring a subrogation action on behalf of its insured against a tortfeasor [or
the] insurance company which is primarily liable to . . . pay any claims on behalf of its
insured.” Id. at 985 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-108). The Utah Supreme Court
never questioned whether State Farm was the real party in interest with standing to bring
the action in its own name.
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Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. involved multiple insurance
companies and the liability of each to defend and pay for environmental clean-up of an
industrial site. 931 P.2d 127 (Utah 1997). Aetna cross-claimed in its own name against
AMICO and Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, seeking subrogation and
contribution for the defense costs it had paid. Id. at 131. Even though “an insurer's
subrogation right is derivative of the rights of its insured,” id., the Utah Supreme Court
did not require Aetna to seek subrogation in the name of its insured. Rather, the Court
held that “Aetna has a valid cause of action for . . . subrogation.” Id. at 142.
Finally, consider the district court matter of AGCS Marine Ins. Co. v. Adler Hot
Oil Serv. Inc., No. 150800020 (Utah 8th Dist. Ct. filed Feb. 26, 2015). (A copy of the
docket and complaint for that matter are included as Addend. D). In that matter numerous
insurers sued in their own names when asserting their subrogation rights, clearly showing
that both insurers and the courts have long interpreted Utah law as allowing an insurance
company to bring a subrogation action in either the name of the insurance company or the
name of their insured.
Under Utah law, a subrogating insurer is, and has long been, a real party in interest
in a subrogation claim. As “the real party in interest . . . the action could be commenced
and maintained in its name.” Nat'l Union, 137 P. at 655. As Utah subrogation law
evolved, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that the insured could also be a real party in
interest, or “co-owner” of the claim. See Johanson, 152 P.2d at 104. However, no case or
statute has altered the long-standing rule that a subrogating insurer is a real party in
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interest in a subrogation claim with the right to bring a subrogation action in its own
name.
C.

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPLIED JOHANSON V.
CUDAHY.
The Utah Court of Appeals relies primarily on the 1944 case, Johanson v. Cudahy

Packing Co., 152 P.2d 98 (Utah 1944), to support its proposition that EMIA cannot bring
a subrogation action in its own name. See Wilson, 2016 UT App 38, ¶¶ 8–11, 368 P.3d
471. Specifically, the court of appeals relies on the following language from Johanson:
“‘it has been generally held that a suit at law to enforce a right of subrogation must, at
common law, be brought in the name of the insured, rather than by the insurance
company in its own name and right.’” Wilson, 2016 UT App 38, ¶ 10, 368 P.3d 471
(quoting Johanson, 152 P.2d at 104). This reliance on Johanson is misplaced primarily
because the portion of Johanson quoted by the court of appeals is not the law the
Johanson Court adopted; specifically, the Johanson Court first analyzed the different
positions taken by other states (including the position quoted by the court of appeals)
before adopting the completely contrary position that, under Utah law, both the insurer
and insured are real parties in interest and both may bring the cause of action in their own
name. Johanson, 152 P.2d at 104–105.
Because the Johanson decision is so important to the court of appeal’s decision in
this matter, this Brief will address in depth the analysis and holding of Johanson v.
Cudahy Packing Company. This Brief will then individually address each instance in
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which the court of appeals relied on Johanson. Finally, this Brief will show how the
holding of Johanson supports EMIA’s position.
1. Analysis and Holding of Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co.
Johanson is a demurrer case in which the court was required to determine the
parties’ rights to bring a wrongful death cause of action in accordance with Utah’s 1933
worker’s compensation subrogation statute. Already established and accepted by the
Johanson Court was the Utah rule that the subrogating insurer is a real party in interest
with right to bring the claim in its own name. Id. at 100, 103–05. The primary question
before the Johanson Court was whether the subrogating insurer is the sole party in
interest or if the injured insured also retained a right to the claim and was also a party in
interest. Id.
The factual background to Johanson is as follows. Robert Johanson died in an
industrial accident in 1938. Id. at 100. His parents applied for and were awarded
industrial compensation for the death of their son in accordance with Utah’s worker’s
compensation statute. Id. While the insurance carrier who paid the award could have
brought a subrogation action against defendants in its own name, the insurer waived its
right to bring the action. Id. at 104. Johanson’s parents then brought a wrongful death
cause of action themselves in their own names. Id. The defendant tortfeasor argued that,
because the parents received a compensation award from the insurer, the insurer was the
sole party in interest and the Johansons “are not the proper parties to bring this action.”
Id. at 102. Defendants argued that only the subrogating insurer who had paid the award
could bring the claim. Id.
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At the time of the Johanson decision, there were three primary views the different
states had adopted concerning in whose name a subrogation action should be brought. See
Michael C. Ferguson, The Real Party in Interest Rule Revitalized: Recognizing
Defendant’s Interest in the Determination of Proper Parties Plaintiff, 55 CAL. L. REV.
1452, 1479–80 (1967), http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
2841&context=californialawreview. The first view was that “actions on subrogated
claims must be prosecuted by the subrogee [insurer] alone.” Id. The second view was that
“such actions [must] be prosecuted by the subrogor [insured] alone.” Id. at 1480. The
final view was that “either the subrogor or the subrogee [may] prosecute such actions.”
Id. In analyzing the issue of whether or not an injured insured is a real party in interest,
the Johanson Court reviewed other jurisdictions’ rulings to see how other states had
addressed this issue, Johanson, 152 P.2d at 102–05, and the Johanson Court examined all
three of the above views. Id.
The first view, that the subrogee/insurer alone was the real party in interest, was
embraced by Justice McDonough in the dissenting opinion. Id. at 110–111 (J.
McDonough, dissenting). Justice McDonough opined that an insurer’s subrogation rights
result in “giving control of the cause of action [to the] insurance carrier. It results in the
. . . insurance carrier becoming the real party in interest . . . . The election by the
employee [to accept compensation from the insurer] divests him of any legal interest in
the cause of action.” Id. at 110 (J. McDonough, dissenting). The Johanson Court did not
adopt this view.
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The second view, that the subrogor/insured was the sole party in interest, was
analyzed but not adopted in the majority opinion. Id. at 103–04. The Johanson Court
noted that cases from several states support this rule. Id. at 103.
These cases proceed upon the theory that the insured is the trustee for the
insurer and that the third party has a right not to have the cause of action
against him split up so that he is compelled to defend two or more actions.
This splitting of the cause of action is avoided by having the suit brought in
the name of the insured for the benefit of himself and as trustee for the
insurance carrier.
Id. at 103–04. Under this rule, the Johanson Court noted “it has been generally held that a
suit at law to enforce such right of subrogation must, at common law, be brought in the
name of the insured, rather than by the insurance company in its own name and right.” Id.
at 104. While this view was contrary to Utah’s precedence (that a subrogating insurer is
the real party in interest in a subrogation claim, see Baker v. Wycoff, 79 P.2d 77, 81 (Utah
1938); Nat'l Union, 137 P. at 655), analysis of this view supported the Johanson Court’s
final holding that the insured should maintain at least some rights to the cause of action.
The view adopted by the Johanson Court was that both the subrogor and the
subrogee are real parties in interest. Johanson, P.2d at 105. This view was analyzed at
Johanson, 152 P.2d at 104–105. The Johanson Court began this line of analysis stating,
“There are cases holding that under statutes similar to Utah statutes relating to proper and
necessary parties plaintiff both the insured and the insurance carrier must be joined.” Id.
at 104. In support of this view, the Johanson Court stated, “insurers which, by
subrogation, are equitable assignees . . . not only are proper parties plaintiff, but must be
joined as such.” Id. at 104 (quoting 96 A.L.R. 884–89). Under the view adopted by the
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Johanson Court, both the insured and insurer were “co-owners of the insured’s right of
action.” Id. at 104.
In applying this view to the facts of the case, the Johanson Court held, “When the
insurance carrier declined to bring its action and executed a waiver thereof, the
dependents were not compelled to forego suit. They have an interest in the recovery and
can bring suit to enforce it.” Id. at 104. The supreme court continued, “The failure on the
part of the plaintiffs to make the [missing party] a party plaintiff, or if it refused to join,
make it a party defendant, is at the most a defect in parties plaintiff. Such a defect is
waived unless raised.” Id. at 104–05. The rule adopted by the Johanson Court is that both
the insurer and insured are real parties in interest. Id. Both parties should be joined as
parties plaintiff. Id. If one of the parties is not joined, “the defendant, by making timely
objection, could have had the [missing party] made a party.” Id. at 107. Failure to join the
missing party is a defect that, unless raised, is waived. Id. at 104–05.
2. The Court of Appeals Misapplied Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co.
The court of appeals misapplied the ruling in Johanson. It took one view analyzed
by the Johanson Court and incorrectly applied that view as Utah law. This mistake is
completely at odds with the actual holding in Johanson, is inconsistent with the
development of Utah’s subrogation law prior to Johanson, and ignores the development
of subrogation case law subsequent to Johanson. See, e.g., Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 931 P.2d 127 (Utah 1997) (allowing insurer to bring subrogation claim
in own name); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Nw. Nat. Ins. Co., 912 P.2d 983 (Utah
1996) (same); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 505 P.2d 783 (Utah 1972) (same); State
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Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 450 P.2d 458 (Utah 1969) (same); Nat'l
Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Grp., 377 P.2d 786 (Utah 1963)
(same).
The court of appeals’ primary application of Johanson was to cite Johanson’s
analysis of the subrogor/insured as sole party in interest view, a view not adopted by the
Johanson Court. Under this rejected view, “‘it has been generally held that a suit at law to
enforce a right of subrogation must, at common law, be brought in the name of the
insured, rather than by the insurance company in its own name and right.’” Wilson, 2016
UT App 38, ¶ 10, 368 P.3d 471 (quoting Johanson, 152 P.2d at 104). However, the
Johanson Court rejected this view. Instead, the Johanson Court adopted the view that
both the insurer and insured are real parties in interest, both are co-owners of the claim,
and both may bring the action in their own name. Johanson, 152 P.2d at 104–105.
The court of appeals cited Johanson for the policy concern that allowing “an
insurer to sue in its own name, except where it has fully indemnified the insured, could
compel the wrongdoer to ‘defend a multitude of suits’ against multiple insurance
companies, the insured, and/or the insured’s dependents or heirs.” Wilson, 2016 UT App
38, ¶¶ 10, 12 n.6, 368 P.3d 471 (citing Johanson, 152 P.2d at 103). However, the
Johanson Court addressed how this concern is resolved under the rule adopted by Utah.
Specifically, the Johanson Court concluded that under the Utah rule (both insured and
insurer are real parties in interest), the multiple suits problem is solved through joinder.
There is but a single cause of action involved . . . . That the insurers as
equitable assignees of the insured are interested therein to the extent of their
payment to the insured . . . does not create other causes of action, legal or
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equitable, against defendants. It is still one cause of action, a single
controversy, owned in common by the insured and the insurers. . . . The
plaintiffs herein, co-owners of the insured’s right of action, were not only
authorized by the state law to sue jointly as they did, but were compelled to
do so. One compelled to join and joined in an action, and having a
substantial interest therin, is not a nominal, but a necessary or indispensable
party.

Id. at 104. The supreme court explained how joinder protects a defendant against multiple
suits. “The one and only interest of [defendant] is that the suit be brought in the names of
those interested in it so that he will not later be made to defend a second suit for the same
wrong.” Id. at 107. The supreme court explained that this “protection [against multiple
suits] is insured here by the fact that the defendant, by making timely objection, could
have had the [missing party] made a party.” Id. at 107. Should the missing party not be
joined, that “is at the most a defect in parties plaintiff. Such a defect is waived unless
raised.” Id. at 105. The multiple suits problem highlighted by the court of appeals is
solved, under Utah law, through joinder.
Finally, the court of appeals notes that in workers’ compensation cases such as
Johanson, the legislature has granted explicit rights to the subrogating insurer, including
“expressly grant[ing] insurers . . . the authority to bring such actions in their own names,”
Wilson, 2016 UT App 38, ¶ 8 n.4, 368 P.3d 471, and “expressly provid[ing] that the
insurer is to be reimbursed before the employee or the employee’s heirs.” Id. ¶ 11 n.5.
While both of these rights do appear in current day statutes, neither right was expressly
granted in the 1933 version of the statute interpreted by the Johanson Court. Rather, the
Johanson Court relied on “general principles of subrogation as affected by statutes
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governing pleading”—rather than express statutory language—in holding that both the
insurer and insured are real parties in interest. Johanson, 152 P.2d at 104 (“when . . . no
special rules for maintaining the [subrogation] action are prescribed, the proceeding to
enforce the rights gained by subrogation will be controlled by general principles of
subrogation as affected by statutes governing pleading.”).
3. The Holding of Johanson Supports EMIA’s Position.
Under Johanson’s holding, both EMIA and Jessica Wilson (or Ms. Wilson’s
estate) are real parties in interest in this suit. Either may maintain the action in their own
name. To protect himself from multiple suits, the defendant could have had Ms. Wilson’s
estate made a party to the proceedings. However, no party sought to have Ms. Wilson’s
estate joined in these proceedings. Failure to join Ms. Wilson’s estate “is at the most a
defect in parties plaintiff. Such a defect is waived unless raised.” Johanson, 152 P.2d at
105. It is important to note that the parties at the trial court level did consolidate the
wrongful death proceeding with the subrogation proceeding. As such, consolidation
provided the defendant with protection from multiple suits in this matter.
The court of appeals misapplied Johanson by relying on language that the
Johanson Court did not adopt as Utah law. The actual holding of Johanson, that both the
insurer and insured are real parties in interest and both may bring the cause of action in
their own name, Johanson, 152 P.2d at 104–105, supports EMIA’s position. EMIA is a
real party in interest and may maintain a subrogation action in its own name.
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D.

THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS CREATED A REQUIREMENT THAT
WOULD MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR AN INSURER TO RECOVER IN
INSTANCES WHERE AN INSURED PASSES AWAY FROM THE
ACTIONS OR INACTIONS OF A TORTFEASOR.
Near the conclusion of its opinion, the court of appeals stated, “EMIA should have

brought its personal injury action in the name of the estate . . . .” Wilson, 2016 UT App
38, ¶ 12, 368 P.3d 471. However, such a requirement ignores § 31A-21-108 and Utah
case law which allows an insurer to bring a subrogation action in its own name, and is
untenable for two reasons. First, it creates a situation where an insurer would have to
initiate a probate proceeding and hope for the assistance of a personal representative who
would likely be unwilling to aid the insurer in its efforts to receive reimbursement; and
second, the requirement runs contrary to rules of statutory interpretation.
First, by requiring an insurer to bring an action in the name of the estate of its
insured, the court of appeals has created a situation where an insurer will likely never be
able to recover if its insured passes away as a result of injuries sustained by the actions or
inactions of a third party. Utah code states in regard to survival actions
A cause of action arising out of personal injury to a person, or death caused
by the wrongful act or negligence of a wrongdoer, does not abate upon the
death of the wrongdoer or the injured person. The injured person, or the
personal representatives or heirs of the person who died, has a cause of
action against the wrongdoer or the personal representatives of the
wrongdoer.
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-107 (emphasis added). Given the language of § 78B-3-107,
which only allows a survival action to be brought by the injured person, personal
representative, or heirs of the deceased, and the court of appeals’ reasoning, an insurer
would be required to initiate a probate proceeding and pursue its claims with the
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assistance of a personal representative who would likely be a family member of the
deceased. If the present matter illustrates anything it is that the interests of the family of a
deceased individual and that of the insurer are often conflicted. A personal representative
or family member would have little incentive to assist an insurer if doing so would
potentially reduce the amount of assets or funds available for the person acting as
personal representative, or other family members, to receive. Creating such a requirement
was unnecessary given § 31A-21-108 allows an insurer to bring a subrogation action in
its own name.
Second, requiring an insurer to sue in the name of the estate of its insured runs
contrary to normal rules of statutory interpretation. The Utah Supreme Court has stated in
regard to statutory interpretation, there is a “general rule that [the court] should construe
statutory provisions so as to give full effect to all their terms, where possible.” Schurtz v.
BMW of North America, Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah 1991). Further, “[w]hen
interpreting statutes, we look first to the statute’s plain language with the primary
objective of giving effect to the legislature's intent.” Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus,
2007 UT 42, ¶ 46, 164 P.3d 384. Also, “‘[w]e presume that the legislature used each
word advisedly’ and read ‘each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning.’”
Id. (quoting State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88, ¶ 29, 127 P.3d 682). Finally, “[s]tatutes should
be read as a whole and their provisions interpreted in harmony with related provisions
and statutes.” Martinez, 2007 UT 42, ¶ 46, 164 P.3d 384. The approach utilized by the
court of appeals ignores Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-108, and allows § 78B-3-107 to
nullify, or swallow, § 31A-21-108. Such an approach runs contrary to the requirement
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that “[s]tatutes should be read as a whole and their provisions interpreted in harmony
with related provisions and statutes.” Martinez, 2007 UT 42, ¶ 46, 164 P.3d 384.
Another approach, which would have given full effect to § 31A-21-108 and § 78B-3-107,
would have been to allow an insurer to recover those damages pertaining to its
subrogation claim, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-108, while allowing heirs to
recover those damages available pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-107, as the
damages that each respective party would be entitled to differ.
E.

THE COURT OF APPEALS IGNORED POLICY IMPLICATIONS.
The court of appeals has also failed to consider serious policy implications. First,

as was noted above, it is unlikely insurers will receive reimbursement if an insured passes
away because of the actions or inactions of a third-party tortfeasor if an insurer cannot
bring a subrogation action in its own name. In order to protect their interests, insurers will
likely add language to their policies excluding coverage for injuries sustained by an
insured that were caused by a third-party, if the insured subsequently passes away as a
result of the injuries sustained. This would inappropriately shift the financial burden from
the tortfeasor to the family of the insured and/or medical providers. Simply put, the Utah
Court of Appeals’ opinion disincentivizes insurers providing coverage for most
catastrophic accidents.
Second, even if insurers do not add exclusionary language to their policies, it is
likely that insurance premiums will increase substantially. When actuaries for insurance
companies determine premiums for insurance policies they generally take into account
the right of the insurer to subrogate against a tortfeasor who has caused the injuries of its
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insured. If an insurer is effectively barred from maintaining a subrogation action because
the insured has died as a result of the injuries sustained, premium rates would increase
since there would be no hope for reimbursement. This is unfair to insureds who would be
forced to bear the burden of increased premiums.
Finally, there are instances where it makes good sense procedurally to allow
insurers to bring subrogation actions in their own names. This is especially true in multiparty actions. In those cases there may be multiple insurers seeking subrogation, and
Plaintiffs seeking redress for tort claims. All of the parties would potentially be suing
under the same name. For example, in matters like AGCS Marine Ins. Co. v. Adler Hot
Oil Serv. Inc., No. 150800020 (Utah 8th Dist. Ct. filed Feb. 26, 2015), where there are
several parties involved, forcing the insurers to sue in the names of their insureds creates
confusion and an organizational nightmare for the district court. All of which is avoided
by simply allowing insurers to bring their subrogation actions in their own names.
F.

HILL AND CEDERLOFF DO NOT STAND FOR THE PROPOSITION
THAT AN HEIR HAS A SUPERIOR RIGHT TO RECOVER IN A
PERSONAL INJURY CLAIM.
In footnote 6 of its opinion, the Utah Court of Appeals states
EMIA asserts that the correct approach would be to allow the insurer and
the heirs to pursue separate claims to recover their respective shares of
damages arising from a personal injury claim. Such an approach would . . .
potentially compromise the heirs’ superior right to recover their share of
the personal injury claim, see Hill [v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 765
P.2d 864, 866 (Utah 1988)]. See Cederloff v. Whited, 169 P.2d 777, 780
(Utah 1946).

Wilson, 2016 UT App 38, ¶ 12 n.6, 368 P.3d 471 (emphasis added). However, neither
Hill nor Cederloff stand for the proposition that heirs have a superior right of recovery.
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The portion of Hill cited to by the Utah Court of Appeals provides a factual
background; the general principle that “Subrogation is an equitable doctrine . . . . [which]
can be modified by contract”; and the obstacles associated with determining whether or
not an insured has been made whole by a settlement when equitable subrogation
principles apply rather than contractual principles. 765 P.2d at 866.3 Hill simply does not
state that heirs have a superior right to recovery.
In regard to Cederloff, that matter did not deal with wrongful death heirs, nor did it
address the issue of priority of recovery between heirs and a subrogated insurer. Instead,
the Utah Supreme Court considered whether or not an insured who had received
insurance proceeds could maintain an action in the insured’s name for amounts that had
been paid by the insurer in behalf of the insured. Cederloff, 169 P.2d at 777–78.
Therefore, similar to Hill, Cederloff does not stand for the proposition that heirs have a
superior right to recovery over an insurer.
II.

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS APPLIED RULE 17 OF THE UTAH
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE INCORRECTLY.
Even if the Utah Court of Appeals correctly interpreted Utah Code Ann. § 31A-

21-108, it misapplied Rule 17 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 17 states
No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the
name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed
after objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder
or substitution of, the real party in interest; and such ratification, joinder, or

3

It should be noted that EMIA was subrogating in accordance with the contractual terms
contained in its insurance policy with Jessica Wilson. As such, much of the doctrine
contained in Hill is inapplicable as the Hill Court applied equitable principles of
subrogation in that matter. See Hill, 765 P.2d at 867.
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substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had been commenced
in the name of the real party in interest.
U.R.C.P. 17(a). (emphasis added).
Despite the clear language in Rule 17, in its opinion, the Utah Court of Appeals
stated, “We conclude that EMIA lacked standing to pursue a subrogation action against
Krueger in its own name. Thus, the trial court erred in dividing the Wilsons’ settlement
with EMIA. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order and remand with instructions
for the trial court to dismiss EMIA’s claims . . . .” Wilson, 2016 UT App 38, ¶ 13, 368
P.3d 471. (emphasis added). EMIA’s ability to bring a subrogation action in its own
name is not a standing issue, rather a real party in interest issue governed by Rule 17,
making dismissal inappropriate. While EMIA believes that it was proper to bring its
subrogation action in its own name, even if it could not, EMIA would have had standing
had it brought its subrogation action in the name of its insured. See Wilson, 2016 UT App
38, ¶ 12, 368 P.3d 471 (“EMIA should have brought its personal injury action in the
name of the estate or intervened in the Wilsons’ action against Krueger.”). Therefore,
pursuant to Rule 17, the Utah Court of Appeals should not have ordered that EMIA’s
claims be dismissed.
The problem with this remedy is illustrated in AGCS Marine Ins. Co. v. Adler Hot
Oil Serv. Inc., No. 150800020 (Utah 8th Dist. Ct. filed Feb. 26, 2015). In that matter
several insurers sued in their own names when asserting their subrogation rights. Shortly
after the Wilson opinion was entered, the insurers in that matter immediately filed
motions to change the named party in interest to their insureds. However, the holding of
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Wilson may not allow for that change, but may require dismissal of the subrogating
insurers’ actions. Such a result is unfair and inappropriate pursuant to Rule 17.
Because EMIA’s ability to bring a subrogation action in its own name is not a
standing issue, rather a real party in interest issue governed by Rule 17, dismissal was
inappropriate.
CONCLUSION
Because EMIA had standing to bring its action in its own name, the decision of the
Utah Court of Appeals should be reversed. Further, even if § 31A-21-108 does not give
EMIA standing to bring an action in its own name, the court of appeals’ decision
requiring the trial court to dismiss EMIA’s action should be reversed as it is contrary to
Rule 17 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
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